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A B S T R A C T
We study skill- and income-related differences in the access to health care as drivers of longevity inequality from
a theoretical life-cycle as well as from a macroeconomic perspective. To do so, we develop an overlapping
generations model populated by heterogeneous agents subject to endogenous mortality. We model two groups of
individuals for whom differences in skills translate into differences in income and in the ability to use medical
technology effectively in curbing mortality. We derive the skill- and age-specific individual demand for health
care based on the value of life, the level of medical technology and the market prices. Calibrating the model to
the development of the US economy and the longevity gap between the skilled and unskilled, we study the
impact of rising effectiveness of medical care in improving individual health and examine how disparities in
health care utilisation and mortality emerge as a consequence. In so doing, we explore the role of skill-biased
earnings growth, skill-bias in the ability to access state-of-the art health care and to use it effectively, and skill-
related differences in health insurance coverage. We pay attention to the macroeconomic feedback, especially to
medical price inflation. Our findings indicate that skill-bias related to the effectiveness of health care explains a
large part of the increase in the longevity with earnings-related differences in the utilisation of health care taking
second place. Both channels tend to be reinforced by medical progress.
Introduction
Growing disparity in longevity across socioeconomic groups has
been extensively documented for the US over the past couple of decades
(Hummer and Hernandez, 2013; Chetty et al., 2016; Case and Deaton,
2017).1 Such a development is unwelcome for a number of reasons.
First, it may conflict with principles of social justice (Fleurbaey and
Schokkaert, 2011) and reflect a general increase in economic inequality
(Autor et al., 2008; Saez and Zucman, 2016) that is detrimental to social
cohesion. Second, inequalities in health have been shown to cause a
drag on economic growth (Grimm, 2011). Third, the variation in life
span due to premature death slows down the overall increase in life
expectancy at the population level (Vaupel et al., 2011) and, thus, so-
cietal progress against an important measure of human development.
Finally, inequality in longevity has considerable implications for the
fairness of pension schemes and the incentives they generate across
different social strata (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine, 2015; Lee and Sanchez-Romero, 2017; Sanchez-Romero
and Prskawetz, 2017).
Three key sources of health-related inequalities can be identified:
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Differences in behaviours (e.g. Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2010; Cutler
et al., 2011), differences in the socio-economic environment (e.g.
Chetty et al., 2016), and differences in the access to innovative health
care (e.g. Phelan and Link, 2005; Glied and Lleras-Muney, 2008).2 This
last source is of particular interest for three reasons: First, by being
directly linked to the design of the health care system, this channel
opens a straightforward way for the policy maker to address health-
related inequalities by way of implementing appropriate policies.
Conversely, the design of the health care system itself may result in
unequal access and health outcomes. Second, differential access to
health care is governed by two key channels: (i) income differences and
differences in health insurance coverage will translate into differences in
the utilisation of health care of given effectiveness; and (ii) differences in
the ability to access or to use appropriately the most advanced medical
treatments translate into different effectiveness of health care for a given
level of utilisation. Third, the income dynamics on the demand side and
medical progress on the supply side may, therefore, be particularly
good candidates for explaining the ongoing widening of the longevity
gap.3
While there is a considerable body of empirical literature on the
access to health care (reviewed in Section “Literature” below), this is
mostly based on particular case studies with a focus on either income
differences or on differences in the utilisation of innovative health care.
Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to provide answers to the fol-
lowing set of questions: (i) How does the inequality in longevity emerge
from the interplay of differential earnings and earnings growth, dif-
ferential access to the most effective medical treatments, and differ-
ential health insurance coverage; (ii) what quantitative importance can
be assigned to these channels; and (iii) how are these channels shaped
by medical progress and by general equilibrium dynamics, in particular
the development of the price for health care?
In order to address these questions, we develop an overlapping
generations model populated by heterogeneous agents subject to en-
dogenous mortality. We model two groups of individuals who differ in
the level of their skills (or educational attainment) and, according to
their labour productivity, receive differential earnings. In addition, we
assume the ability to access and use new medical technology effectively
to increase with skills, implying a differential impact of health care on
survival. Individuals maximise their life-cycle utility by purchasing a
consumption good from which they derive utility and elective health
care with a view to affecting their survival prospects, the latter
proxying also for an individual’s health status. Assuming that the health
status determines non-elective (emergency) health care, we keep track
of this additional and quantitatively important determinant of health
care spending. The economy consists of two sectors: a medical sector
providing (elective and non-elective) health care, and a production
sector producing consumption and capital goods. The relative price of
health care is determined endogenously and depends on the sector-
specific use of production factors and their general equilibrium prices.
We derive the age-specific individual demand for health care based
on the value of life, the level of medical technology and the consumer
price of health care. Given the income level as well as the effectiveness
of medical care within each of the two groups, we are able to determine
a baseline level of mortality inequality. We then employ counterfactual
analysis to identify the impact on health care utilisation and longevity
of (i) skill-biased technological progress in the production sector,
leading to a widening in the earnings gaps; (ii) skill-bias in the access to
state-of-the art medical care and its effective application (or shorter:
skill-bias in medical effectiveness); and (iii) skill-biased coverage of
health insurance. We pay particularly close attention to macroeconomic
effects caused by differential productivity growth and medical progress
on the price for medical care and its feedback on the individual demand
for health care within the two groups. When studying the role of pro-
ductivity growth, we follow Baumol’s (1967) theory, according to
which productivity gains in capital-intensive sectors do not only cause
income growth but also led to rising production costs in labour-in-
tensive sectors, such as health care. Given that income growth dis-
proportionately benefits high skilled individuals, whereas the price for
health care rises for all individuals, this may also imply a widening gap
in the access to health care. We explore the relevance of this channel in
affecting mortality inequality.
We calibrate the model to reflect the development of US income and
life expectancy over the time span 1960–2015. In so doing we follow
Cutler et al. (2006) and Ford et al. (2007) in attributing 50% of the
reduction in mortality to changes in the utilisation and effectiveness of
health care. Focusing in our analysis on the role of health care, we
assume a constant exogenous trend for the remaining 50% that is in line
with the data. Here, we make use of recent evidence by Cutler et al.
(2011) showing for the US that the education gap in mortality that can
be attributed to behavioural channels has remained remarkably stable
over the time frame 1971–2000.
We replicate in our model the increase by some 2.1 years in the life
expectancy gap between the 50 percent top earners (representing the
skilled) and the 50 percent bottom earners (representing the unskilled)
in the US over the time span 1960–2015. We find that about 19 percent
of the increase are explained by skill-biased earnings growth, about 57
percent by skill-bias in medical effectiveness, and 5 percent by health
insurance, whereas 24 percent of the increase are explained by the fact
that the initial (1960) gap in earnings translates into a difference in
health care spending which owing to medical progress leads to a
widening gap in survival. Thus, the skilled are able to expand their
relative survival opportunities predominantly (i) due to a rising ability
and propensity to spend on health care in the presence of skilled-biased
earnings growth; (ii) due to their better access to state-of-the-art care
for any given level of health care spending, an effect which is ex-
acerbated due to medical progress overall;4 and (iii) due to a com-
plementarity between income and medical progress such that their
higher consumption of health care from the outset allows them to
participate to an increasing extent in the benefits from medical ad-
vances. Finally, we find that while medical prices increase by a factor of
about 1.5 over the time span 1960–2015, this does not contribute to a
widening in the longevity gap.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section “Literature”
provides a review of some recent empirical and theoretical literature on
health inequality within life-cycle models with a particular focus on the
utilisation of health care. Section “Model” introduces the model;
Section “Equilibrium analysis” presents the equilibrium allocation;
Section “Numerical analysis” introduces the calibration of the model
(Section “Calibration Strategy”) and provides the results of our nu-
merical analysis (Sections “Scenarios” and “Explaining the growth in
the life-expectancy gap”); Section “Policy implications and the role of
medical progress” discusses policy implications and the role of medical
progress; Section “Conclusions” concludes. Some mathematical deri-
vations and details on the numerical simulation have been relegated to
an Appendix.
2 For general surveys and summaries of the debate on what are the drivers of
health-related inequality see Deaton (2003), Phelan et al. (2010), Woolfe and
Braveman (2011), Truesdale and Jencks (2016) and Case and Deaton (2017).
3 By medical progress we refer to the development and adoption of both new
medical technology and innovative medical practice both of which raise the
effectiveness of medical treatments.
4 Intuitively, access to the state-of-the-art treatment for a given condition only
matters once effective treatments have been developed. Thus, skill-related
differences in access are reinforced over time with the advent of more and more
effective treatments.
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Literature
In this section, we briefly review the empirical and theoretical lit-
erature that is pertinent to our analysis. As we have argued in the in-
troduction, the literature suggests two particularly prominent drivers of
unequal access to health care: First, skill-biased technological progress
across many sectors of the economy has been extensively documented
to generate a widening income gap in advantage of the skilled and
educated [see Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for an overview]. A large
empirical literature shows how income differences translate into dif-
ferences in the consumption of health care and, more specifically, in the
access to highly effective state-of-the-art health care (e.g. Getzen, 2000;
Bago d’Uva and Jones, 2009; Vallejo-Torres and Morris, 2013). Owing
to their higher propensity to consume health care, wealthier individuals
then tend to participate more strongly in the benefits from medical
progress (Goldman and Lakdawalla, 2005). Second, even at the same
level of consumption of health care, medical progress is prone to lead to
divergent medical outcomes and trends to life expectancy if individuals
from higher socioeconomic groups are able to utilise medical advances
more effectively (Phelan and Link, 2005; Glied and Lleras-Muney,
2008; Avitabile et al., 2011; Lange, 2011; Hernandez et al., 2018) or
have access to higher quality treatments (Fiva et al., 2014).5
Our work ties in with a number of recent papers addressing the
income and education related inequality in health outcomes within
calibrated life-cycle models. Capatina (2015) studies the role of dif-
ferent health risks over the life-cycle across different strata of educa-
tion. She does not, however, endogenise the consumption of health
care. Ales et al. (2014) study the (social) efficiency of differences in
health care spending and, depending on this, in longevity across in-
dividuals with different earnings potential. Ozkan (2014) studies the
incentives for individuals from different income groups to invest in
preventive and curative care in a model in which health shocks lead to a
deterioration of a stock of health and higher mortality. He finds that the
subsidisation especially of preventive health care for the poor may yield
significant welfare gains. Prados (2017) studies the interrelationship
between income and health inequality over the working life with a
particular focus on the feedback from health on earnings. Finally, Cole
et al. (2018) study the impact of recent US reforms aimed at curbing
health-related discrimination within the labour and insurance markets
on preventive behaviour and welfare when individuals differ in their
health.
None of these works addresses the dynamics of the education/in-
come gradient in mortality as a consequence of skill-biased productivity
growth and skill-biased access to medical progress. Such an analysis is
important, as it provides a sound theoretical basis for understanding
and assessing the transmission channels that underlie the empirical
findings on the impact of education and income on individuals’ pro-
pensity to benefit from health care and medical progress. To our
knowledge, the only other theoretical approach towards understanding
the role of differential access to medical progress is Goldman and
Lakdawalla (2005). Studying a static model in which an individual
maximises utility depending on health and consumption, they identify
the greater demand for health care on the part of individuals with high
socio-economic status (conditional on medical need) as a key condition
for a differential impact on longevity of productivity growth in the
health care sector. This is because an increases in medical productivity,
in their case modelled as a decline in the price of health care, tends to
boost the demand for health care by more for those with greater socio
economic status. While the greater propensity to benefit from medical
progress for those with high demand also plays a role in our model, the
mechanism goes through the effectiveness of medical technology rather
than the productivity of the health care sector. Indeed, in line with the
empirical evidence the price in health care is increasing in our model
rather than declining. More generally, our paper relates to an emerging
literature on the role of medical progress within the macroeconomy
(Suen, 2009; Chandra and Skinner, 2012; Fonseca et al., 2013; Jones,
2016; Koijen et al., 2016; Frankovic et al., 2017; Schneider and
Winkler, 2017; Böhm et al., 2018; Frankovic and Kuhn, 2018). Covering
various aspects of medical progress, these works do not address its role
as a driver of the emerging longevity gap.
Model
We consider two groups of individuals who differ in their skill
(education) level =i s u, , with s denoting the skilled and u denoting the
unskilled, respectively. The differences in skills translate into (i) dif-
ferential labour productivity and, thus, into differential earnings (as
documented e.g. in Acemoglu and Autor (2011)); and (ii) into differ-
ential ability to use medical technology/know-how effectively in order
to improve health and survival chances (as documented e.g. in Glied
and Lleras-Muney (2008), Avitabile et al. (2011), Lange (2011),
Hernandez et al. (2018)). Both groups are represented by overlapping
generations of individuals who choose consumption and health care
over their life-course. We should stress at this point that we are not
interested in explaining the causality of income as opposed to education
as drivers of inequality in health, nor any reverse causality, but rather
in exploring the channels through which differences in education/skills
translate into different participation in the benefits from health care
and medical progress. In light of this, we also abstract from the inter-
generational transmission of skills and wealth and assume individuals
are randomly assigned to either of the skill groups at birth.
Individual life-cycle
We begin by specifying the mortality process that is underlying our
model. We assume the force of mortality, =µ m h M( , ), to follow a
proportional hazard form, where > 0 is an exogenous shifter of
mortality and where=m h M h( , ) ,M (1)
describes the impact of h units of elective health care on mortality, with>M 0 measuring its effectiveness. Allowing for heterogeneity across
skill types, =i s u, , age, a, and time, t, in regard to the consumption of
elective health care, h a t( , )i , the exogenous component of mortality,
a t( , )i , and medical effectiveness, M t( )i , we can write the
a t i( , , )-specific force of mortality as6
µ a t a t m h a t M t( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ), ( )).i i i i (2)
While a t( , )i captures exogenous age- and time-related trends to
mortality as well as heterogeneity across skill groups unrelated to the
consumption of health care, M t( )i can be interpreted as the degree to
which an individual of skill type i has access to innovative treatments at
time t or, equivalently, the degree to which a type i uses a given set of
treatments effectively. Intuitively, we would expect < M t M t0 ( ) ( )u s ,
implying that unskilled individuals may suffer from restrictions in the
access to the most effective health care. Such restrictions may arise
from knowledge gaps, from lack of social capital in the communication
with physicians, or from less effective use of innovative medicine, e.g.
due to lack of compliance with certain treatment paths or due to the
negligence in the attention of regular screening. In summary, the extent
to which the unskilled suffer from a higher mortality,>µ a t µ a t( , ) ( , )u s , depends (i) on the extent of an exogenous dis-advantage >a t a t( , ) ( , )u s related to life-style and/or living
5 See Schröder et al. (2016) for a recent systematic review of the literature on
the SES gradient in the access to treatment for coronary heart disease, high-
lighting effects of both income and education.
6 We could assume that medical effectiveness also depends on age. We omit
age as an argument as we are subsequently not using it in our calibration.
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environment, (ii) on the extent to which they consume a lower quantity
of elective health care, <h a t h a t( , ) ( , )u s , and (iii) on their relative
disadvantage in the access to (or use of) the most effective form of
medical care, <M t M t( ) ( )u s .
We can now formulate the survival function
=S a t µ a t da, exp , ^i a i0
as the probability of a type =i s u, to survive from birth at time=t t a0 through age a at time t.7 Following Chandra and Skinner
(2012), Kuhn et al. (2015) and Frankovic et al. (2017) we can interpret
survival, S a t( , )i , as a proxy of the stock of health at a t i( , , ).For the
representative individual, the assumption that health care can slow
down but not reverse the decline of health over the life-course is
plausible and well in line with evidence on the gradual accumulation of
health deficits (Rockwood and Mitnitski, 2007; Dalgaard and Strulik,
2014).
Building on this notion, we assume that besides deciding on the
quantity of elective health care, h a t( , )i , individuals also receive
emergency health care according to a function
=e S S( ) ,1 2 (3)
with 01 and [0, 1]2 , depending on their health/survival state,
S [0, 1].
This reflects the notion that in situations of critical illness, as
proxied by a low probability of survival, individuals must consume a
quantity of health care >e 0 in order to survive without having a de-
gree of choice. Note that the dependency of emergency care on survival
also implies that the consumption of health care tends to be higher close
to the time of an individual’s death (e.g. Zweifel et al., 1999). When
chosing elective health care, individuals internalice the savings on ex-
penditure for emergency health care, as they accrue from higher levels
of survival/health over the life-cycle.
Finally, we assume that during each period of their lives individuals
enjoy an instantaneous utility
= +u c c b( )
1
,
1
(4)
from consumption c 0, where > 1 denotes the inverse of the inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution, and where >b 0 is a constant
“pleasure of living” high enough to ensure that >u c( ) 0 for all relevant
values of consumption.8
Based on these ingredients, we can formulate the individual life-
cycle problem according to which a representative from group =i s u,
who is born at =t t a0 maximises the present value of the utility
stream over their (remaining) life-cycle by choosing a stream of con-
sumption, c a t( , )i , and elective health care, h a t( , )i , subject to the
mortality process and a budget constraint. Formally, the objective is
then given by
e u c a t S a t damax , , ,
c a t h a t
a
i i
( , ), ( , ) 0i i (5)
where and denote the rate of time preference and the maximal
attainable age, respectively. The individual faces the following skill-
specific state constraints:
=S a t µ a t S a t( , ) ( , ) ( , ),i i i (6)
= + + ++
k a t r t k a t l a w t c a t
a t p t h a t e S a t a t a t
s t
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
( , ) ( )[ ( , ) ( ( , ))] ( , ) ( , )
( ),
i i i i
i i i i i
(7)
with = + =S t S t(0, ) 1, ( , ) 0i i0 0 and = =k t k t(0, ) ( , ) 0i i as
boundary constraints. Survival is reduced over the life-course according
to the force of mortality. The individual’s stock of assets, k a t( , )i , (i)
increases with the return on the current stock, where r t( ) denotes the
interest rate at time t; (ii) increases with earnings, l a w t( ) ( )i , where l a( ),
as specified in (21) below, denotes the exogenous labour supply of an
individual at age aand where w t( )i denotes the skill-specific wage rate
at time t; 9 (iii) decreases with consumption, the price of consumption
goods being normalised to one; (iv) decreases with private health ex-
penditure, +a t p t h a t e S a t( , ) ( )( ( , ) ( ( , )))i i i , where p t( ) denotes the
price for health care, where a t( , )i denotes an a t i( , , )-specific rate of
coinsurance, as specified in (19) below, and where the total consump-
tion of health care amounts to the sum of elective health care, h a t( , )i ,
and emergency care, e S a t( ( , ))i ; (v) decreases with an a t i( , , )-specific
tax schedule, a t( , )i , as specified in (23) below; (vi) increases with
a t i( , , )-specific social security benefits, a t( , )i as specified in (20)
below; and (vii) increases with a lump-sum transfer s t( ), as specified in
(24) below, by which the government redistributes accidental bequests
across the population. We follow Frankovic et al. (2017) and others by
considering a setting without an annuity market.
Note that while the market-wide interest rate, r t( ), the price for
health care, p t( ), and the lump-sum transfer s t( ), are identical for both
skill groups, their wages are skill-specific, where we would typically
expect w t( )s w t( )u , reflecting higher productivity of the skilled. The co-
insurance rate, tax-rate and pension benefits are also allowed to vary
with the skill level.10
Population
Denoting by B t( )0 the total number of births at time t0, we obtain=N a t S a t B t a( , ) ( , ) ( )/2ic i as the size of the cohort of skill level=i s u, that was born at time =t t a0 and is alive at age a and time
t.11
By aggregating over age and skills, we obtain the following ex-
pressions for the population size (total and by skill group), aggregate
capital stock, aggregate effective labour supply (total and by skill
group), aggregate consumption (of final goods) and aggregate (con-
sumption of) health care (total and by skill group):12
7 Note, that = +t t a^ o .
8 Our assumption > 1 reflects our calibration in Section “Calibration
Strategy” and is in line with the evidence in Chetty (2006).
9 We consider skill-independent labour supply l a( ) for lack of data. However,
this does not imply a loss of generality, as for the purpose of the present analysis
it is sufficient to focus on the pattern of skill-specific earnings w t l a( ) ( )i .
10 To summarise the individual problem in a nutshell: The individual’s choice
variables are (i) elective health care, h a t( , )i , affecting mortality,
m h a t M t( ( , ), ( ))i i , and in turn survival, S a t( , )i , depending on the exogenous
state of medical technology, as captured by the parametric function M t( )i ; and
(ii) consumption, c a t( , )i , affecting period utility, u c a t( ( , ))i . Survival, in turn,
determines emergency health care, e S a t( ( , )i , and both survival and period
utility determine life-cycle utility. All prices are given for the individual, as are
taxes, social security transfers, health insurance coverage and accidental be-
quests.
11 We realise that the assumption of an equal distribution of births across
skill-groups is artificial. However, as we will argue in Section “Calibration
Strategy” in greater detail, the 50–50 split of the population implies by con-
struction that relative group size is immaterial. It is sufficient then to focus on a
representative individual from each of the skill-groups. We need to keep track,
however, of the total population size in order to arrive at a realistic age-
structure of the population.
12 Note that all aggregate variables are shaped by the (equilibrium) patterns
of health care (by skill and age), which through the survival function determine
the age-structure of the population, as measured by the cohort sizes N a t( , )ic .
Furthermore, the capital stock, K t( ), and aggregate consumption, C t( ), reflect
the age-skill patterns of savings and individual consumption, while aggregate
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= + = =N t N t N t N t N a t da i s u( ) ( ) ( ) with ( ) , , ,s u i ic0 (8)
= + = =L t L t L t L t l a N a t da i s u( ) ( ) ( ) with ( ) ( ) , , ,s u i i ic0
(9)
= +K t k a t N a t k a t N a t da( ) [ ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )] ,s sc u uc0 (10)
= +C t c a t N a t c a t N a t da( ) [ ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )] ,s sc u uc0 (11)
= +
= + =
H t H t H t H t
h a t e S a t N a t da i s u
( ) ( ) ( ) with ( )
[ ( , ) ( ( , ))] , , .
s u i
i i i
c
0 (12)
We assume that births grow exogenously at the rate such that= >B t B B( ) exp , 0.t0 0
Production
The economy consists of a manufacturing sector and a health care
sector. In the manufacturing sector a final good is produced by em-
ployment of capital, KY , as well as skilled and unskilled labour, LsY and
LuY , respectively. Assuming a neo-classical Cobb-Douglas production
function =Y A K L L A K L L( , , , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,Y Y sY uY Y Y sY uYK s u (13)
with + + = 1K s u and with AY denoting total factor productivity,
we can write profit in the manufacturing sector as= +V Y A K L L w L w L r K( , , , ) [ ] ,Y Y Y sY uY s sY u uY Y (14)
with 0 denoting the rate of capital depreciation. Intuitively, and in
line with evidence on the wage patterns (e.g. Acemoglu and Autor,
2011), we have s u. Indeed, we will assume in Section “Calibration
Strategy” that in line with skill-biased technical progress the factor
shares change over time such that >s u. 13
In analogy to final goods production, we assume that health care is
produced by employment of capital, KH , as well as skilled and unskilled
labour, LsH and LuH , respectively. Again, we assume the production of
health care to follow a neo-classical Cobb-Douglas function=F A K L L A K L L( , , , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,H H sH uH H H sH uHK s u (15)
with + + = 1K s u and with AH denoting total factor productivity,
and obtain profits= +V pF A K L L w L w L r K( , , , ) [ ]H H H sH uH s sH u uH H (16)
where p is the price for health care. Note that = =V V 0Y H in a per-
fectly competitive equilibrium. Again, we assume s u and >s u.
We allow the factor elasticities in the health care sector to differ
from those in final goods production, where in line with evidence in
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) we assume <K K , implying that the
health care sector is less capital intensive. We also allow for cross-
sectoral differences in the labour shares, i i for =i s u, , and in total
factor productivity, A AH Y .
Health insurance, social security, taxation, and accidental bequests
We consider two forms of health insurance: Medicare, as a public
insurance for the population aged 65 and above, and private health
insurance for the full population. Medicare pays age-specific but time-
uniform co-payments such that =a( ) 0.5MC for a 65 and =a( ) 0MC
for <a 65 . These co-payments are financed from a dedicated pay-roll
tax at rate t( )MC such that the budget constraint+
= ++ +
t w t L t w t L t
p t h a t e a t N a t
h a t e a t N a t
da
( )[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
( )
2
[ ( , ) ( , )] ( , )
[ ( , ) ( , )] ( , )
MC
s s u u
s s s
c
u u u
c65 (17)
with +h a t e a t( , ) ( , )i i denoting the equilibrium level of health ex-
penditures for a t i( , , ), is satisfied at each point in time.14 Private health
insurance at an a t i( , , )-specific coverage rate a t1 ( , )iP is paid for by
a t i( , , )-specific premiums= +a t a t p t h a t e a t a t i( , ) [1 ( , )] ( )[ ( , ) ( , )] ( , , )iP iP i i (18)
such that the insurer breaks even on each individual contract at each
point in time. Co-payments at age/year a t( , ) for an individual be-
longing to group =i s u, are thus given by= +a t a a t( , ) ( ) ( , ).i MC iP (19)
Social security benefits are assumed to follow
= <a t at a( , ) 0 65( ) 0 65,i i (20)
where we assume that all individuals retire fully at age 65, such that
= <l a l a a
a
( )
^ ( ) 0 65
0 65
.
(21)
Social security is assumed to be funded from a dedicated pay-roll tax at
rate t( ) such that the budget constraint
+ = +t w t L t w t L t t N a t t N a t da( )[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )]s s u u s sc s uc65
(22)
is satisfied. Finally, a skill/income-specific labour income tax is raised
at rates =t i s u( ), ,iIT , the proceeds of which are used to fund exo-
genous government expenses >G t( ) 0 according to the budget con-
straint + =t w t L t t w t L t G t( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )sIT s s uIT u u . Thus total tax pay-
ments (including private health insurance premia) at age/year a t( , ) for
an individual belonging to group =i s u, are given by= + + +a t t t t l a a t( , ) [ ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( , ).i MC iIT iP (23)
Finally, we assume that accidental bequests are redistributed in a lump-
sum fashion across the population, such that each individual who is
alive at t receives a transfer
= +s t µ a t k a t N a t µ a t k a t N a t da
N t
( )
[ ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )]
( )
,s s s
c
u u u
c
0
(24)
with population size N t( ) given by (8). Note that the redistribution of
accidental bequests across income groups implies a certain levelling of
divergences in wealth. We aim for this specification as the accidental
bequests under consideration likely are a poor proxy for systematic
differences in inheritances as drivers of a widening inequality in wealth.
For robustness, we have also run the model under the assumption that(footnote continued)health care expenditure, H t( ), reflect the age-skill patterns of elective and
emergency health care.
13 The Cobb-Douglas specification in (13) amounts to the special case of the
typical CES formulation with a unitary elasticity of substitution between skilled
and unskilled labour (see e.g. Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). The focus of the
present analysis being on the implications of differential earnings growth for
health care rather than the underlying employment changes, we believe this
simplification does not greatly bear on our results.
14 For a precise definition, we have e a t e S a t( , ) ( ( , ))i i with
S a t a t m h a t M t da( , ) exp[ ( , ^) ( ( , ^), (^)) ]i
a
i i i0 .
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accidental bequests are redistributed within skill groups but have found
little quantitative difference.15
Equilibrium analysis
Life-cycle optimum
In Appendix “Optimal solution to the life-cycle problem” we show
that the optimal patterns of consumption and elective health care for
individuals from group =i s u, can be described as follows.
For the CES specification of utility in (4), the optimal pattern of
consumption is characterised by the Euler equation+ = +
+
{
}
c a t a a
c a t
r t a a
µ a t a a da a a t i
( , )
( , )
exp 1 [ ( )
( , )] ( , , , ),
i
i a
a
i (25)
requiring that the ratio of consumption for any two ages/years+a t a a( , ) and a t( , ) equals the interest r (·) net of the effective
discount rate + µ (·)i , weighted by the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution 1/ and compounded between these ages/years.16 Im-
portantly, the uninsured mortality risk emerges as an additional factor
of discounting in the absence of annuities. Rising mortality then implies
a downward drag on consumption towards the end of life. Moreover,
differences in mortality across the skill groups, translate into different
patterns of discounting. More specifically, if the unskilled face a greater
mortality risk, i.e. if µ µ(·) (·)u s for all a a a[ , ] with a strict in-
equality for at least one a , then <+ +c a t a ac a t c a t a ac a t( , )( , ) ( , )( , )u u s s , implying thatthe unskilled are prone to consume earlier in life and save less.
In order to describe the optimal level of elective health care
spending it is helpful to define the value health/survival for an in-
dividual of group =i s u, at age/year a t( , ), which for the specifications
of emergency health care and utility in (3) and (4), respectively, is
given by
= + ++ + + +
+
+
a t
c a t a a b
a t a a p t a a e S a t a a
r t a a da da
( , )
( , )
( , ) ( ) ( ( , ))
exp
.
i
a
c a t a a
i
i i
a
a
( , )
1
2
i
(26)
The value of an improvement in health/survival at a t( , ) thus amounts
to the discounted stream over the expected remaining life-course a[ , ]
of (i) the monetary value of consumption utility, c (·)
1
i , (ii) the monetary
value of being alive, c b(·)i , and (iii) the expected cost saving with
respect to emergency care expenditures, p e(·) (·) (·)i2 . It is readily
checked that the value of health/survival at each a t( , ) increases with
the level of the individual’s consumption over the remaining life-course,
and with the savings on future emergency health care. If their higher
income allows the skilled to sustain a higher level of consumption
throughout their entire life course, this immediately implies a higher
value of health/survival. In addition, if the skilled are facing lower
mortality rates, their consumption tends to be shifted towards later
stages of the life-course, implying that the wedge in the value of health/
survival tends to increase with age. These tendencies are offset, how-
ever, if poorer health, <S S(·) (·)u s , exposes the unskilled to higher
payments for emergency care, >e S e S( (·)) ( (·))u s , which in turn trans-
late into a larger incentive to save such costs.
For the specification of mortality in (1), the optimal level of elective
health care for type =i s u, at age/year a t( , )
=h a t M t µ a t a t
a t p t
a t i( , )
( ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( )
( , , ),i
i i i
i (27)
is then (implicitly) determined by the value of elective health care,
M t µ a t a t( ) ( , ) ( , )i i i , divided by its consumer price, a t p t( , ) ( )i . 17 The
value of elective health care, in turn, is given by the individual’s value
of health/survival, a t( , )i weighted by a factor M t µ a t( ) ( , )i i re-
presenting the effectiveness of health care, as measured by the elasticity
M t( )i , and the need for health care, as measured by the current mor-
tality rate µ a t( , )i .
Skilled individuals tend to demand a higher volume of elective
health care, >h a t h a t( , ) ( , )s u , as they attach a higher value to health/
survival, >a t a t( , ) ( , )s u , as they have access to more effective health
care, >M t M t( ) ( )s u , and as they enjoy a higher level of health in-
surance coverage [see Capatina (2015) for the US], such that<a t a t( , ) ( , )s u . These tendencies are offset to the extent that the
skilled face a lower mortality, <µ a t µ a t( , ) ( , )s u . Note, however, that
higher emergency spending may expose the unskilled to similar or even
greater total expenditure on health care.
General equilibrium
Referring the reader to a more rigorous characterisation of the
general equilibrium in Appendices “Characterisation of general equili-
brium” and “Equilibrium relationships with cobb-douglas technologies”
we restrain ourselves here to a brief intuitive description. Perfectly
competitive firms in the two sectors =j Y H, choose capital, K t( )j , and
the two types of labour, L t( )i j with =i s u, , so as to maximise their
respective period profit (14) and (16). The six first-order conditions
determine the six (sector-specific) factor demand functions, depending
on the set of prices r t w t w t p t{ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )}s u . 18 Likewise, we obtain the
age- and skill-specific demand for consumption goods, c a t( , )i , and
health care, h a t( , )i , from the sets of first-order conditions (25) and (27)
of the individual life-cycle problem. The age profiles of individual
wealth, k a t( , )i , then follow implicitly from the life-cycle budget con-
straint (7). Aggregating across age-skill-groups at each point in time t
according to (10)–(12) gives us the aggregate supply of capital, K t( ),
and the two types of labour, L t( )i with, =i s u, , as well as the aggregate
demand for consumption C t( ) and health care H t( ).
The general equilibrium characterisation of the economy is com-
pleted by the set of five market clearing conditions
+ =+ =+ == + +=
L t L t L t
L t L t L t
K t K t K t
Y A t K t L t L t C t K t K t
F A t K t L t L t H t
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )) ( )
s
H
s
Y
s
u
H
u
Y
u
Y H
Y Y
s
Y
u
Y
H H
s
H
u
H
corresponding to the skill-specific labour markets, the capital market,
the market for final goods and the market for health care, respectively.
From these, we obtain a set of four equilibrium prices
15 More specifically, we find that income from bequests is moderately higher
for the skilled if bequests are distributed within skill groups. However, in all
cases income from bequests is very small in relation to earnings, implying that
the bequest rule plays no role in quantitative terms.
16 Taking logs and considering the limit a a it is straightforward to convert
(25) into the dynamic representation of the Euler equation= r t µ a t[ ( ) ( , )]ci a tci a t i( , )( , ) 1 .
17 This condition is equivalent to the condition =a t a t p t m( , ) ( , ) ( )/ (·)i i h ,
requiring that the value of health and survival equals the effective price of
survival, as given by the effective consumer price a t p t( , ) ( )i weighted by
m1/ (·)h , which is the volume of health care required to lower mortality by
one unit.
18 An interior allocation is guaranteed (i) by the Inada conditions being sa-
tisfied by Cobb-Douglas function, and (ii) by a single constraint on the supply of
unskilled labour (see Appendix “Equilibrium relationships with cobb-douglas
technologies”).
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r t w t w t p t{ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )}s u and the level of net capital accumulation
K t( ). Appendix “Equilibrium relationships with cobb-douglas technol-
ogies” derives equilibrium prices and quantities based on the Cobb-
Douglas production functions specified in (13) and (15), respectively.
Numerical analysis
Calibration strategy
In the following, we solve the model outlined in the previous section
by means of a numerical simulation. For this purpose, we calibrate the
model to reflect the development of the US economy over the 55-year
time span 1960–2015, capturing the evolution of income and life-ex-
pectancy among rich and poor individuals as well as the growth of
average health care expenditures, medical technology and the price for
medical care. While we assume general equilibrium, we do not impose
balanced growth assumptions but rather consider the economy’s de-
velopment over the time span 1960–2015 as a transition path between
two steady states, lying outside the time frame under consideration.19
In order to study the various drivers of differential longevity
growth, we first introduce exogenous time trends to the skill-specific
labour shares in a way that replicates the evolution of the income dis-
tribution. As the labour share of the skilled group grows at the expense
of the unskilled, the skilled (unskilled) group’s per-capita yearly income
matches the evolution of mean income among the top (bottom) 50% of
the income distribution, as found in the data. We then apply average
federal tax-rates such that we obtain realistic after-tax income growth
within each group. Hence, our model incorporates the increasing in-
come inequality in the US over the last decades, as driven by skill-
biased technological change.
Second, we introduce exogenous medical progress that increases the
effectiveness of medical care in our model economy. Here, we assume
for the unskilled relative to the skilled a lag of 8 years in the access to
the state-of-the art medical technology. This lag increases the life-ex-
pectancy gap between the skill groups to a realistic level and con-
tributes to a widening of the gap over time.
Third, following Capatina (2015) we consider skill-related differ-
ences in health-insurance coverage. The unskilled are subject to a
slightly lower degree of coverage, exposing them to a higher consumer
price of health care.
Fourth, in line with a considerable body of evidence (see Sheiner
and Malinovskaya, 2016) we assume slower productivity growth in the
health care sector as opposed to final goods production. In line with
Baumol (1967), this implies that the health care sector absorbs an in-
creasing share of labour, while at the same time the price of health care
increases endogenously.
Due to these four factors that govern the access of the two skill/
income groups to effective health care, life-expectancy among the
skilled/rich and unskilled/poor diverges endogenously in the model.
The diverging life-expectancies match quite well recent data on the
development of life-expectancy by income strata as provided by Chetty
et al. (2016). The model thus offers an economic rationale for the trends
observed. Given the finding by Cutler et al. (2011) that changes in
behavioural patterns have contributed relatively little to the progres-
sion of the life-expectancy gap, we conjecture that a large part of the
trend can, indeed, be explained by differential access to health care.
Our analysis will allow us to assess the contribution of each of the four
channels. Further details on the calibration and data we employ are
provided in the following, a technical description of the numerical so-
lution method is provided in Appendix “Solving the numerical pro-
blem”.
Demography
Individuals enter the model economy at age 20 and can reach a
maximum age of 100 with model time progressing in single years.20 In
our model, a “birth” at age 20 implies a maximum age = 80. Popu-
lation dynamics are partly endogenous due to mortality that is de-
termined within the model and partly exogenous due to a growth of
“births” at the fixed rate = 0.017, which together with the underlying
survival process generates a share of the population 65+ and of the
aggregate labour force participation that is roughly in line with the
data.21 An in-depth description for our modelling of mortality and
survival is provided further on below.
Note that the size of the skilled and unskilled group does not change
over time and the overall population grows at a constant rate. This
assumption is reflecting our choice of the skilled (unskilled) group to
represent the 50% of population with top (bottom) earnings at each
point in time. While this obviously amounts to an approximation of
unobserved skills (or education) through income, we believe this to be
legitimate in the light of observational equivalence in our data. We
should also stress that we understand skilled/rich and unskilled/poor
individuals to be representatives of their respective groups. Thus, we
cannot - and for reasons of modelling clarity - do not wish to model the
transition of individuals between the high and low income groups.
Income
Data on the market income evolution of the rich and poor in our
model is based on the evolution of mean income within the top and
bottom 50% of the households in the US, as provided by the United
States Census Bureau, Table H-3.22 Since after-tax income is the deci-
sive variable in the spending decisions of households, we also match the
after-tax income evolution of the two groups in our model with the
respective trends for the top and bottom 50% of households. For this
purpose, we employ data from Congressional Budget Office (2016) on
the mean market income and after-tax income of households in quin-
tiles for the year 2013. Since the same publication shows that market-
income and after-tax income inequality among US households has not
diverged to any great extent over the last decades, we use the 2013
ratio of after-tax to market income of the top and bottom 50% to obtain
average tax rates for each group, namely 22.7% for the top income
group and 8.7% for the bottom income group. We then introduce these
figures as exogenous labour income tax rates on each group separately
and obtain a realistic evolution of after-tax income inequality in the
model. For the lack of better data, we assume that the age-specific la-
bour supply does not differ between skill groups and is constant over
the whole time horizon (while wages increase). We then proxy the ef-
fective labour supply of both age groups by an age-specific income
schedule taken from Frankovic et al. (2017).
Life-expectancy, mortality, medical progress and emergency expenditure
Average life-expectancy among individuals from the top and bottom
50% income groups are taken from Chetty et al. (2016).23 The data
19 More details on the simulation can be found in the final paragraph of
Appendix “Solving the numerical problem”.
20 We follow the bulk of the literature and neglect life-cycle decisions during
childhood.
21 Our model generates a share of the population 65+ of 13.3% and 17.7%
for 1960 and 2010, respectively. Following US census data (adjusted to refer to
the population without individuals aged less than 20) the corresponding em-
pirical targets are 14.8% (1960) and 17.7% (2010).
22 The Table H-3 “Mean Household Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5
Percent” is available athttps://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/
demo/income-poverty/historical-income-households.html. We approximate
the top (bottom) 50% mean income by the average of mean incomes among the
top (bottom) three fifths, where the third fifth receives only half the weight in
each of our two groups.
23 We use Table 2 from the accompanying website athttps://healthinequality.
org/data/. Life-expectancy is given disaggregated to sex and hundred income
percentiles. We aggregate the data to obtain average life-expectancy among the
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series is limited to the years 2001 through 2014. However, by applying
the calibration procedure described shortly to mortality data from the
Human Mortality Database we are able to trace the group specific life-
expectancy back to earlier years.
We begin by noting that, based on (1) and (2), the force of mortality,
µ a t( , )i , is endogenously determined in the model and depends on
health care, h a t( , )i , as a decision variable, on the access to the newest
medical technology, M t( )i , and on the exogenous shifter a t( , )i . We
then calibrate the parametric components of (2) as follows.
First, we fix the exogenous skill-gradient in mortality that is un-
related to health care by employing the evidence by Cutler et al. (2011)
that a t a t( , )/ ( , ) 0.9s u at all times and for all age groups.24 In order
to capture the age-component of a t( , )i , we consider the year 1980 and
find the pattern for a( , 1980)s that together with=a a( , 1980) ( , 1980)/0.9u s generates age-specific mortality rates for
the US that match the data in the Human Mortality Database. Following
the evidence in Ford et al. (2007) that around 50% of the decline in
(coronary) mortality can be attributed to medical care, we fit a time
trend to a t( , )s that, again under preservation of the relationship=a t a t( , ) ( , )/0.9u s , explains 50% of the decline in average mortality
over the time span 1960–2015.25 The implied schedules of a t( , )i are
combined with the initial income gap in 1960 to determine the initial
life-expectancy gap in the model.
Second, and turning to the part of mortality that is amenable to
health care, we choose the elasticity of mortality with respect to health
care utilisation, =m h m M/h , in the range of 0.1 to 0.25 for both
skill groups, which over the time frame 1960–2015 are in line with the
estimated elasticities reported in Hall and Jones (2007).
Third, we choose a growth trend to medical effectiveness such that
together with the spending elasticities and the exogenous component to
mortality explain the joint evolution of health care expenditure per
capita and longevity averaged across both skill groups.
Fourth, we assume that medical effectiveness for the unskilled lags
behind the respective value for the skilled. We choose a lag of 8 years
which, in the presence of medical progress and the skill-specific pat-
terns for health care, increases the life-expectancy gap to a magnitude
in line with the data.26 Thus, we set =M t M t( ) ( 8)u s . Assuming M t( )s
to reflect the state-of-the-art medical technology, we impose a growth
trend on M t( )s that together with the lagged M t( )u is consistent with the
growth of the life-expectancy in the data for the two skill-groups.
Note, however, that changing the path of the frontier technology
M t( )s for a given a t( , )i will change the share of mortality decline that
is attributable to health care. Thus, our initial calibration of a t( , )i
(chosen to match a 50% share) needs to be redone for the new path of
M t( )s . Vice versa, changing the calibration of a t( , )i will require ad-
justing the path of M t( )s to obtain the empirical evolution of life-ex-
pectancy. For this reason, we apply the calibration strategy iteratively
until both the share of mortality reductions attributable to health care
as well as the life-expectancy evolution across groups match their em-
pirical targets.
Finally, we assume that the parameters in (3), describing the func-
tional form for emergency health care, are given by = 0.31 and = 0.12
in our calibration.27
Utility
For the instantaneous utility function in (4), we choose the inverse
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to be = 1.125, which is
within the range of the empirically consistent values identified by
Chetty (2006). Setting =b 9 then guarantees that u c a t( ( , )) 0i for all
a t i( , , ) and generates an average VOL that lies within the range of
plausible estimates, as suggested in Viscusi and Aldy (2003).28 More-
over, we assume a rate of time preference = 0.02.
Finally, following Frankovic and Kuhn (2018) we impose a
minimum consumption level equal to the social security benefit (of the
bottom 50%) at a given point in time. We do so in order to avoid ne-
gative asset holdings at old age, as would otherwise result from ex-ante
optimisation.29 Given that retirees cannot usually borrow against pen-
sion income and given that individuals are downspending their assets in
old age (as they do within our model) the minimum consumption
constraint is plausible.
Health insurance, social security and taxation
We follow Capatina (2015) with respect to the calibration of in-
surance coverage. She reports average co-payment shares for in-
dividuals with (skilled) and without (unskilled) college education over
the time frames 1996–2002 and 2003–2010, respectively. Table 1
provides an overview of average health expenditure shares payed for by
various insurance programs. The Medicare tax rate t( )MC and the
private health insurance premium a t( , )iP are then determined in
equilibrium according to the budget constraints (17) and (18), respec-
tively.
Individuals aged 65 or above receive Social Security (SS) benefits
financed by a payroll-tax levied on working individuals. We use data
from the EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits30 that report average SS
income for five income quintiles for those aged 65 and higher from
1976 to 2012. From this, we construct average SS income for the top
and bottom income group following the same method as for market
income. The data indicates that SS income for the bottom 50% has
increased from 6400 (2012 constant) USD in 1976 to 9400 USD in
2012, whereas SS benefits for the top 50% have risen from 13600 USD
to 14650 USD. In the model, total social security outlays are fully fi-
nanced by a payroll tax levied uniformly on all workers at a given point
in time. The payroll tax t( ) is calculated according to the budget
constraint (22) and amounts to 5.2% in 1975 and 8.6% in 2015.
(footnote continued)
top and bottom 50% of income distribution.
24 We obtain the ratio a t a t( , )/ ( , ) 0.9s u from Table 4 in Cutler et al.
(2011) as follows. Here, the relative risk figures for Model A reflect the un-
conditional mortality ratio µ t µ t µ t( ) ( )/ ( )uc s u , whereas the figures for Model
B reflect relative mortality conditioned on behaviours. Denoting this ratio by
µ t( )c , assuming that the ratio a t a t( , )/ ( , )s u predominantly reflects beha-
vioural differences, neglecting the age component and employing the identity=µ t µ t t t( ) ( )[ ( )/ ( )]uc c s u gives us =t t µ t µ t( )/ ( ) ( )/ ( )s u uc c . According to
column (1) in Table 4 Cutler et al. (2011), reflecting data from 1971–1975, we
have =µ t( ) 0.78uc and =µ t( ) 0.88c so that =a t a t( , )/ ( , ) 0.89s u . Similar va-
lues obtain for columns (2)-(6), with =a t a t( , )/ ( , ) 0.9s u being well in the
middle of the range.
25 We were unable to retrieve evidence on the role of behavioural factors as
opposed to medical care for other diseases than coronary heart disease. We thus
assume the findings by Ford et al. (2007) to be representative.
26 Lags by socio-economic status in the diffusion/uptake of state-of-the art
medical procedures have been reported for a number of conditions and health
care settings (e.g. Skinner and Zhou, 2004; Korda et al., 2011, Wang et al.,
2012; Hagen et al., 2015; Clouston et al., 2017) with some notable exceptions
(Goldman and Smith, 2005). Most of these studies find that these lags translate
into mortality differences, again with some exceptions (Hagen et al., 2015).
27 While we were unable to identify direct evidence to inform our calibration
of 1 and 2 we chose the values in a way that generates a plausible pattern of
health expenditures across the skill groups. Not adjusting health expenditure for
health status through the dependency in ( 3) would generate much too high an
expenditure gap in favour of the skilled.
28 The model yields a value of life of approx. 4 million USD for skilled and 1.5
million USD for unskilled individuals.
29 Individuals choose old-age consumption at the beginning of their life, at-
taching a low probability to reaching very high ages. Consumption allocated to
these ages (in the absence of a minimum consumption level) is thus very low
and can fall below the social security income, such that it is optimal to pay back
debt (accumulated to finance consumption at earlier ages) at very high ages
with excess social security income.
30 The complete Databook is available at https://www.ebri.org/publications/
books/index.cfm?fa=databook. The data we use is provided in chapter 3.
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Finally, we set the income tax rates =t( ) 0.227sIT and =t( ) 0.087uIT
to match the US after-tax earnings distribution in the year 2013.
Production technology and productivity growth
Following Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008), we set the capital share
in final goods production and in the health care sector to = 1/3K and= 1/5K and keep these values constant for all times.31 In contrast, we
assume time-dependent factor shares for skilled and unskilled labour
and set their values as follows. For t 1960, we set =t( ) 1/2s for the
final goods sector and =t( ) 3/5s for the health care sector. Noting that=t t( ) 1 ( )u K s and =t t( ) 1 ( )u K s we obtain=t( ) 1/6u and =t( ) 1/5u for t 1960, respectively. Hence, the la-
bour share in each sector is divided in a way, that three quarters of
labour income go towards the skilled workers. This generates a ratio of
skilled vs. unskilled earnings in line with the US earnings data.
We then scale A t( 1960)Y such that the absolute values of earnings
match the targeted values in =t 1960. In order to match the evolution
of the absolute value of skilled earnings and the ratio between skilled
and unskilled earnings after 1960, we choose an appropriate growth
rate for A t( )Y as well as for t( )s and t( )s , assuming that they preserve
the (initial) ratio =(1960)/ (1960) 5/6s s . This calibration strategy
yields a growth rate of 0.7% for A t( )Y and an increase of t( )s and t( )s
by 10% over 50 years up until =t 2010, such that =(2010) 0.55s and=(2010) 0.66s .
According to Eq. (44) in Appendix “Equilibrium relationships with
cobb-douglas technologies”, the evolution of the price of health care is
determined by the growth rate of A t( )H together with the evolution of
the interest rate.as well as the skilled and unskilled wage rate. The
latter two being targeted to replicate the data on after-tax earnings, we
choose the growth rate of A t( )H to be 1%, as this value induces p t( ) to
grow over time in accordance with data by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis on the growth of medical prices relative to the overall CPI.32,33
The interest rate is endogenously determined and evaluates at=r t( ) 0.040 in 1975 and =r t( ) 0.027 in 2015. The decline in the in-
terest rate is due to population ageing and a subsequent increase in
average savings across the population.
Overview of functional forms and parameters
Table 2 summarises the most important parameters we are em-
ploying.
Scenarios
In the following, we present five sets of results. To begin with, the
benchmark scenario in Section “Benchmark” describes the development
of the economy and the resulting inequality in longevity over the time
span 1960–2015. Set against this, we study the following counterfactual
scenarios. Recalling the three forms of skill-bias in (i) earnings growth,
(ii) medical effectiveness, and (iii) health insurance, we first study three
counterfactual scenarios in each of which we eliminate one form of
skill-bias, assuming the benchmark trend for the remaining two. Thus,
in Section “Counterfactual I: No skill-bias in earnings growth” we
consider the absence of skill-bias in productivity change and wage
growth; in Section “Counterfactual II: No skill-bias in the effectiveness
of health care” we consider the absence of a lag in the access of the
unskilled to the most effective health care; and in Section
“Counterfactual III: No skill-bias in health insurance coverage” we
consider the absence of a skill-bias in health insurance coverage.
We amend this analysis by studying a fourth counterfactual in
Section “Counterfactual IV: No medical price inflation”, where we as-
sume the price for medical care to be fixed while letting the three forms
of skill-bias follow their benchmark trends. This is to gauge whether
medical price inflation, which per se is without bias, leads to skill-re-
lated differences in access.
Finally, we study in Section “Explaining the growth in the life-ex-
pectancy gap” a counterfactual for which we assume the simultaneous
absence of skill-bias in all three dimensions, leaving medical price in-
flation to take place as in the benchmark. We employ this “triple”
counterfactual to identify the joint contributions of the three dynamic
forms of skill-bias in the access to effective health care.
Benchmark
As is well known, the US have experienced more than half a decade
of growing earnings inequality (Autor et al., 2008; Acemoglu and
Autor, 2011). In our benchmark, we trace this development over the
Table 1
Insurance share of health expenditures.
Top 50% Bottom 50%
1996–2002 2003–2010 1996–2002 2003–2010
Employer-based insurance,
during working life
0.651 0.637 0.588 0.546
Employer-based insurance
during retirement
0.141 0.126 0.111 0.093
Medicare 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Total Retirement 0.641 0.626 0.611 0.593
Table 2
Model parameters.
Parameter & Functional Forms Description
= 80 life span=t 19500 entry time of focal cohort= 0.02 pure rate of time preference= 1.125 inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution= 0.05 rate of depreciation= 0.33K elasticity of capital in Y= 0.2K elasticity of capital in F= 0.31 scale of emergency health care function= 0.12 elasticity in emergency health care function
1960 1980 2000 20200
5
10
15
After−tax income
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Fig. 1. Evolution of after-tax wages for the (skilled) top 50% (blue, solid) and
the (unskilled) bottom 50% (cyan, dashed); Circles denote after-tax mean in-
come of the top and bottom 50% as reported by the US census office. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)
31 Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) refer to the US NAICS classification cate-
gory 62 “Health care and social assistance”, which includes ambulatory health
care services (621); hospitals (622); nursing and residential care facilities (623);
and social assistance (624) as reported by the Bureau of labour Statistics.
32 Again, we calibrate iteratively: changes in A t( )Y and A t( )H will affect not
only p t( ) but also r t( ), which in turn feeds back into p t( ), implying we have to
readjust A t( )Y and A t( )H until we find a pattern consistent with the data.
33 Note that negative productivity growth in the US health care sector (in
terms of non-quality adjusted output) at around 1% is consistent with the
empirical evidence from recent studies (Triplett and Bosworth, 2004; Harper
et al., 2010).
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time span 1960–2015 for the after-tax earnings of the top 50% group as
opposed to the bottom 50% group. In terminology of our model, we
understand these two groups to be the “skilled” with high earnings as
opposed to the “unskilled” with low earnings. Fig. 1 plots differential
earnings growth in our model against the data. Recall that earnings
growth reflects the exogenous trends in the income shares for skilled
and unskilled labour, t t( ), ( )s u and t t( ), ( )s u , respectively.
Furthermore, we assume medical technology to grow exponentially
in a way that the increase in skill-specific life-expectancy in the model
matches the data (Fig. 2, left panel). This embraces the lag of 8 years for
the unskilled to have access to the most effective health care, implying
that =M t M t( ) ( 8)u s .
The third bias in respect to health insurance coverage is reflected in
the insurance shares presented in Table 1. While across the two time
frames 1996–2002 and 2003–2010 there is a general trend towards a
lower share of private health insurance, this is more pronounced for the
50% bottom earners. On average, over 2003–2010 their employer-
based insurance coverage during working life amounts to only 85.7% of
the coverage enjoyed by the 50% top earners. At 73.8%, the coverage
gap for employer-based insurance becomes more pronounced during
retirement, but this is largely compensated for by the availability of
Medicare.
As Baumol (1967) shows, lagging productivity growth in the health
care sector as opposed to final goods production leads to the realloca-
tion of labour into the more labour intensive health care sector as well
as to an increase in the wage rate(s). In combination, these effects drive
up the price of health care, reflecting the increasing relative cost of
producing health care (Fig. 2, right panel).34 Over the time span
1980–2000, medical prices have risen 1.6 times faster than the overall
CPI according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This compares quite
well with the 1.5-fold increase in p over the same time period in our
benchmark economy.
Due to differential income growth, differential access to the most
effective health care, differential health insurance coverage, and pos-
sibly due to the increase in the price of health care, the life-expectancy
of the top and bottom 50% earners diverges over time, as can be seen in
Fig. 3.
While life-expectancy increases by some 11.3 years from 76.2 in
1960 to 87.5 in 2015 for the high skilled top earners it increases by only
9.2 years from 73.8 to 83.0 for the low skilled. This amounts to almost a
doubling of the life-expectancy gap from 2.4 years in 1960 to 4.5 years
in 2015.
Fig. 4 plots average health care expenditure, p t H t N t( ) ( )/ ( )i i with
N t( )i and H t( )i defined in (8) and (12), respectively, within each skill
group =i s u, . It can be seen that one factor underlying the growing
life-expectancy gap is the gradual divergence between the spending
paths of the skilled as opposed to the unskilled. Here, the skilled
increase their spending at a much higher rate, which is well in line with
the complementarity between income growth and medical progress as
drivers of health care expenditure (Fonseca et al., 2013; Frankovic and
Kuhn, 2018).
Counterfactual I: No skill-bias in earnings growth
In the following subsections, the benchmark run will be represented
by blue solid graphs, whereas the respective counterfactual experiments
will be represented by green, dashed graphs. As a first counterfactual,
we consider a set-up where from 1960 onwards there is no skill-bias in
earnings growth, in the sense of the income shares for skilled and un-
skilled labour remaining constant at their 1960 levels over the time
span 1960–2015. Technically, this amounts to assuming
t( ) (1960)scf s and t( ) (1960)scf s for all t. What remains is the
initial earnings gap, while medical progress and health insurance con-
tinue to be biased in favour of the skilled, as they are in the benchmark
scenario.
As can be seen in Fig. 5, the discontinuation of skill-biased earnings
growth leads to a sizeable “redistribution” of income in favour of the
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Fig. 2. Evolution of the level of medical technology for the skilled, M t( )s (blue, solid), and unskilled, M t( )u (cyan, dashed); and evolution of the price for medical care
p t( ). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Life−expectancy at birth
year
Fig. 3. Evolution of life-expectancy for skilled (blue, solid) and unskilled (cyan,
dashed). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the
reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 4. Average health care expenditures for the skilled (blue, solid) and un-
skilled (cyan, dashed). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this
figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
34 See Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) for a thorough analytical treatment of
the underlying mechanisms as well as Frankovic et al. (2017) for a discussion
how medical progress may lead to similar allocational impacts.
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unskilled. While the reduction in earnings growth for the skilled implies
an after-tax income in 2015 that is around 10% below its benchmark
level, the unskilled receive a significant boost to earnings, leaving them
with an after-tax income in 2015 that is around 36% above the
benchmark level.
Fig. 6 shows that the removal of the skill-bias in earnings growth
from 1960 onwards slows down the increase in the health care spending
gap. With the skilled spending moderately less and the unskilled
moderately more, there is a relative closure in the gap. However, for
two reasons this effect is rather limited: First, the unskilled continue to
suffer from the initial earnings gap, and, owing to the complementarity
between income and medical progress, this translates into a lower in-
centive to expand health care spending in response to medical progress.
Second, the incentive for the unskilled to expand health care spending
is curbed by the relatively low effectiveness of the health care they can
access, whereas the incentive for the skilled to reduce spending is
curbed by the relatively high effectiveness of the health care foregone.
This notwithstanding, a counterfactual break on the ongoing di-
vergence of earnings together with the resulting reallocation of health
care expenditure would slow down the growth in the longevity gap
(calculated as the difference in life expectancy at each point in time)
between the skill groups, as is visualised in Fig. 7. Absent the con-
tinuation of skill-biased earnings growth from 1960 to 2015, the
longevity gap would expand by only 1.7 years instead of 2.1 years.
Counterfactual II: No skill-bias in the effectiveness of health care
This counterfactual explores the role of skill-bias in the access to (or
in the use of) state-of-the-art medical technology. The green, dashed
plot in the following graphs thus refers to a counterfactual scenario in
which there is no lag in the evolution of medical technology available to
the unskilled, such that M t M t( ) ( )ucf s for the time span 1960–2015. As
Fig. 8 shows, the immediate access to state-of-the-art medical tech-
nology would boost the increase in life-expectancy among the unskilled
and would slow down the increase in the longevity gap from 2.1 to only
0.9 years by 2015.
Surprisingly, the immediate access to effective health care does not
raise much the average health care spending among the unskilled (see
Fig. 9)).35 Thus, the counterfactual reduction in the longevity gap is
explained by the higher.effectiveness of health care utilisation by the
unskilled alone.
Counterfactual III: No skill-bias in health insurance coverage
Here, we assume that for unskilled individuals co-insurance levels
are lowered to those faced by the skilled, such that a t a t( , ) ( , )ucf s
over the time span 1960–2015. This amounts to an increase in health
insurance coverage at the lower end of the income distribution, which
to some extent is representing the idea of the 2010 Affordable Care Act
(Obama Care). The effects we find are very small, and we therefore
abstain from illustrating them graphically. Overall, the life-expectancy
gap would be about 0.1 year lower in 2015 in the absence of a skill-bias
in health insurance. Given the relatively minor differences in health
insurance coverage between the top 50% and bottom 50% income
groups (consult Table 1 for the magnitudes involved), this is un-
surprising.
We should caution, however, that our focus on two income groups
only is likely to obscure much larger effects at the tails of the dis-
tribution. In particular, we would expect a lot of variance in the degree
of health insurance coverage within the bottom 50% income group
where many individuals within the lowest income strata are lacking
health insurance entirely. Opening access to health care for these in-
dividuals through the provision of health insurance should yield sig-
nificant gains in longevity.
1960 1980 2000 20202
2.5
3
3.5
4
After−Tax Income: unskilled
year
$ 1
00
00
1960 1980 2000 20204
6
8
10
12
After−Tax Income: skilled
year
$ 1
00
00
Fig. 5. Evolution of earnings for the skilled and unskilled: Benchmark (blue, solid) and counterfactual I (green, dashed). (For interpretation of the references to colour
in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 6. Average health care expenditures for skilled (blue, solid in the bench-
mark and dark-green, dotted in counterfactual I) and unskilled (cyan, dashed in
the benchmark and light-green, dotted in counterfactual I). (For interpretation
of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)
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Fig. 7. Evolution of life expectancy gap: Benchmark (blue, solid) and coun-
terfactual I (green, dashed). (For interpretation of the references to colour in
this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
35 At the level of the individual, it can be verified that health care expenditure
is deferred to later stages of the life-cycle, but this does not lead to an increase
in per capita spending among the unskilled.
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Counterfactual IV: No medical price inflation
In this counterfactual, we explore whether the inflation in the price
for health care, as is induced by productivity growth in the final goods
sector, exacerbates inequality in the access to health care and the re-
sulting gap in life-expectancy. One concern may be that the unskilled
are doubly punished by not participating in productivity-driven in-
creases in earnings while at the same time being exposed to price in-
flation in the health care sector. Thus, we consider a counterfactual
scenario in which we fix to a constant level the price for health care
from 1980 onward, such that =p t p( 1980) (1980)cf , as is depicted in
Fig. 10. Note that this implies that from 1980 onward the health care
market does not actually clear in the counterfactual.
In the absence of medical price inflation, the average demand for
health care rises for both groups relative to the benchmark (see right
panel in Fig. 11) while average health care expenditures fall within
both groups (see left panel in Fig. 11). Note that this is consistent with a
demand elasticity of health care below one (McGuire, 2012). As a
consequence of the greater demand for health care in the absence of
medical price inflation, life-expectancy rises for both groups relative to
the benchmark (Fig. 12).
Notably, this has no significant effects on the life-expectancy gap, as
seen in Fig. 13.
Indeed, in the absence of medical price inflation (from 1980 on-
ward) both groups would face an increase in life expectancy by about
1.25 years in 2015. Thus, while medical price inflation slows down in a
substantial way the expansion in life expectancy, it does not increase
the gap. As the right panel in Fig. 11 shows, medical price inflation
curbs the demand for health care for the skilled to a greater extent. In
and of itself, this would suggest even a closure in the life expectancy
gap, which is (marginally) true. This effect, in turn, however is offset by
the fact that due to decreasing returns of health care, the reduction in
health care from a lower level leads to a larger increase in mortality for
the unskilled.
Explaining the growth in the life-expectancy gap
In order to gauge the contribution of the three forms of skill-bias
towards explaining the growth in the life-expectancy gap over the time
span 1960–2015 we consider a final counterfactual (V) in which we
assume the absence of skill-bias in all three directions, amounting to the
combined application of the assumptions for the counterfactual sce-
narios (I)–(III). For this scenario, we find an increase of 0.5 years in the
longevity gap from 2.4 years in 1960 to 2.9 years in 2015.
This implies that about 24% of the 2.1 year increase in the longevity
gap in the benchmark scenario remain unexplained by skill-bias. Given
the evidence in Cutler et al. (2011) that behavioural changes have
contributed little to the increase in the longevity gap and given our
finding that medical price inflation has no sizeable impact, the ”re-
sidual” increase can be attributed to income-related differences in the
use of new medical technology and in the gains from it. Although the
income gap is assumed not to widen beyond its initial 1960 value, the
persistence of a (constant) income gap in itself induces a widening of
the longevity gap. This is because the propensity to expend on in-
creasingly effective health care increases at a higher rate for the top
earners due to the complementarity between income and medical
progress Thus, any given gap in income generates more and more di-
verse outcomes over time, reflecting the lower capacity of the unskilled
to participate in the benefits from medical progress.
We conclude by summarizing in Table 3 the contribution of the
various channels to the increase in the longevity gap over the time span
1960–2015. We omit medical price inflation [counterfactual (IV)] as it
did not generate a sizeable impact.
According to the last column of the table, skill-bias in earnings
growth, in the access to state-of-the art medical technology, and in
health insurance coverage account for about 19%, 57% and 5%, re-
spectively, of the increase in the longevity gap. Strikingly, about 70% of
the combined effects can be attributed to a bias in the lack of access to
the newest medical technology. This said, income differences matter
not just through their dynamic effect but also through their interaction
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Fig. 8. Evolution of life-expectancies and life-expectancy gap: Benchmark (blue, solid) and counterfactual II (green, dashed). (For interpretation of the references to
colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 9. Average health care expenditures for skilled (blue, solid in the bench-
mark and dark-green, dotted in counterfactual II) and unskilled (cyan, dashed
in the benchmark and light-green, dotted in counterfactual II). (For inter-
pretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred
to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 10. Evolution of the price for medical care: Benchmark (blue, solid) and
counter-factual IV (green, dashed). (For interpretation of the references to
colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)
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with (unbiased) medical progress. With 24% of the total increase in the
longevity gap being attributable to this channel and, thus, only 76%
being attributable to the combination of the three forms of skill-bias, we
find that, in sum, the individual biases I-III are ”overpredicting” the
longevity gap by some 5%.
While this amounts to only a moderate “error”, it suggests that
complementarities between the different forms of skill-bias do not
matter much in explaining the combined effect. This may appear sur-
prising in light of the finding by Fonseca et al. (2013) and Frankovic
and Kuhn (2018) that the complementarity between income, medical
progress and health insurance is crucial for explaining the increase in
health expenditures. To understand the absence of complementarity
across the different biases, it is helpful to realise that complementarities
take effect through spending incentives, where e.g. the willingness to
spend an additional dollar of income increases with the effectiveness of
medical technology. While such a mechanism is, indeed, underlying the
dynamics in counterfactual V and counterfactual I; it is absent from
counterfactual II on skill-bias in medical effectiveness, where the im-
pact on the longevity gap essentially arises for given spending patterns.
At the same time, the effects through counterfactual III on skill-bias in
health insurance are quantitatively small. Thus, with two of the three
biases unrelated in a quantitatively meaningful way to changes in
spending incentives, this shuts down the channel for complementarities
to take effect across the skill-biases addressed in I-III.
Policy implications and the role of medical progress
Our results suggest that a policy-maker concerned about unequal
access to health care should pay particularly close scrutiny to two
features of the access to health care, both of which are intricately re-
lated to medical progress.
First, it may well be more effective to enable disadvantaged groups
to access the most effective forms of health care and use health care
effectively than to mitigate a divergent ability of different social groups
to pay for health care. Notably the skill-bias in the effectiveness of
health care, as measured by M t M( )/s u= =t M t M t e( ) 1 ( )/ ( 8) 1 1s s g8 M , increases in the rate of med-
ical progress, gM . Thus, while welcome per se, a higher pace of medical
progress may well exarcerbate the access gap to the disadvantage of the
unskilled if they are struggling with catching up. Thus, policies based
on the provision of information on the availability and effective use of
state-of-the-art diagnosis and treatment as well as targeted programmes
that facilitate the access to advanced and complex hospital care and/or
pharmaceutical therapies are likely to prove more effective than a pure
redistribution of income. Especially, the introduction of appropriate
programmes of managing chronic conditions appears to be important
here (e.g. Schoen et al., 2008; Röttger et al., 2017). Stretching beyond
health care policies, our results reinforce earlier findings that the pro-
vision of universal education that helps individuals to manage their
health and overcome access barriers to the health care system (re-
gardless of income) should be instrumental in lowering the longevity
gap.
Second, and now turning to the role of income as a determinant of
access, even if the widening of the income gap can be stopped, this
would not stop the widening of the longevity gap that comes with
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Fig. 11. Average health care expenditures pH N/i i and demand H N/i i for the skilled =i s (blue, solid in the benchmark and dark-green, dotted in counterfactual IV)
and unskilled =i u (cyan, dashed in the benchmark and light-green, dotted in counterfactual IV). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend,
the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 12. Evolution of life-expectancy: Benchmark (blue, solid) and counterfactual II (green, dashed). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 13. Evolution of life-expectancy gap: Benchmark (blue, solid) and coun-
terfactual IV (green, dashed). (For interpretation of the references to colour in
this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
I. Frankovic and M. Kuhn The Journal of the Economics of Ageing xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
13
continued medical progress. Even just to arrest the divergence in
longevity, the policy-maker would effectively have to close the income
gap. Conversely, while being welcome per se, even unbiased medical
progress, such that =M t M t( )/ ( ) 1 0s u , is prone to bring about an
increasing gap in life-expectancy at least within (private) health care
systems with substantial co-payments. Intuitively, income differences
do not translate into different demand for health care unless it is suf-
ficiently effective in lowering mortality. The implication is that with a
view to maintaining or reducing the longevity gap, increasingly rapid
medical progress would need to be accompanied by policy measures
that enhance the purchase of health care especially by lower income
strata or ensure equal consumption by other means, such as the public
provision of health care. In that sense European health care systems
with their greater focus on public provision are likely to be more robust
against an unequal distribution of the benefits from medical progress.
Conclusions
We have studied an overlapping generations model in which re-
presentatives of two groups, the skilled and the unskilled, purchase
health care towards extending their longevity. The unskilled are subject
to four disadvantages: they face lower earnings to begin with, they face
lower earnings growth due to skill-biased technological change, they
face a lag in access to the most effective medical technology, and they
benefit less from health insurance. Based on a calibration of the model
to reflect the US economy and health care system over the time span
1960–2015 we study the extent to which these four disadvantages ex-
plain the emerging longevity gap between the recipients of the top 50%
(net) income, tantamount to the skilled in our model, and the recipients
of the bottom 50%, tantamount to the unskilled. We find that while all
four channels contribute to the emergence of the longevity gap, dif-
ferences in health insurance coverage and differential earnings growth
explain the least of the increase while skill-bias in the access to and use
of advanced medical technology plays a very strong part. Notably,
however, even in the presence of symmetric access to state-of-the art
health care, the skilled are prone to benefit more, and increasingly so,
from medical progress than the unskilled. This is owing to the higher
propensity of high income earners to spend on health care into which
medical progress is ”embedded”. Due to the complementarity between
income and medical progress, this propensity increases over time,
driving a growing spending wedge between the skilled and the un-
skilled. We find that both that the impact of both skill-bias in income
and skill-bias in effectiveness tends to be magnified in the presence of
medical progress. The risk of the disadvantaged being increasingly left
behind in environments with rapid medical change calls for accom-
panying policies both in regard to incentivising and enabling the dis-
advantaged to participate in the benefits from medical progress.
While our model offers a first theory-guided perspective on the
channels through which socioeconomic inequality drives inequality in
longevity, a number of open issues merit further attention. First, by
considering a fixed population that is split into the 50 percent top
earners as opposed to the 50 percent bottom earners our current model
abstracts from the way in which the income distribution relates to the
distribution of skills or education for that matter. We believe this sty-
lisation to be immaterial for our current results as (i) educational
choices are not the focus of this analysis; and (ii) the evolution of wages
is taken from the data and, as such, reflects the dynamics of the un-
derlying education/skill structure. Our modelling of a population
cleanly structured by the 50% top and bottom earners then has the
merit of allowing a clean characterisation of the representative life-
cycle allocation within each group and a clean comparison of outcomes
across the two groups. It does rule out, however, the study of societal
and/or policy changes that lead to changes in the educational dis-
tribution. There is an interest in understanding how these changes de-
termine the shape of the income distribution in a richer model in which
wages are not just driven by exogenous (biased) productivity growth
but also by the size and labour supply of the different skill groups. From
a quantitative angle, there is an interest in disaggregating the two
groups into finer grained social strata in order to identify the longevity
impact of what is likely to be much larger heterogeneity in terms of
access barriers to effective health care at the tails of the distribution.
Further scope for research lies in an analysis of the extent to which the
access to health care is shaped by family background.36 Chetty et al.
(2004) document rather stable patterns of social mobility for the US
over time but argue that consequences may be harsher with rising in-
equality. Böhm et al. (2015) show that the public provision of higher
education yields only limited retruns to the low skilled. Our analysis
suggests that similar arguments are likely to apply in respect to the
social gradient in the access to innovative medicine and the resulting
health outcomes.
Second, we assume that health only bears on longevity, whereas in
reality the feedback channel of health on labour supply and, thus, on
income is prone to play a role. This is particularly true for the unskilled
who typically face health-related restrictions in their labour supply
fairly early on in life. Prados (2017) estimates the contribution of health
differences to the emergence of earnings inequality over the life-cycle to
be around 9 percent. While raising policy issues in its own right, we
would consider this feedback to be of comparatively minor importance
in respect to the main objective of our paper which was to assess the
contribution of (exogenous yet properly calibrated) earnings inequality
as opposed to other skill/education-related drivers of the longevity gap.
Third, we have cast our study against a US backdrop, which may
raise questions about the extent to which our results extend to
European health care systems that typically feature more extensive
health insurance coverage or the straight public provision of health
care. Better access in financial terms would clearly imply a smaller
longevity gap and one that is more prominently driven by direct skill/
education-bias in the access to state-of-the art health care, as docu-
mented by Fiva et al. (2014) for Norway, or in the effective use of
health care, as documented by Avitabile et al. (2011) for a set of Eur-
opean countries. Strikingly, however, Bago d’Uva and Jones (2009) and
Vallejo-Torres and Morris (2013) provide evidence of a positively
sloped income gradient in utilisation even in the absence of substantial
out-of-pocket payments. To study this issue, one would require a non-
trivial extension of the model where the demand for health care is
governed by a time cost. A positively rather than negatively sloped
income gradient in utilisation would then seem to imply that the
Table 3
Comparing Benchmark and Counterfactuals (CFs) to identify contribution of biases.
Longevity gap in 2015 Increase 1960–2015 due to bias share of benchmark incease explained
Benchmark 4.5 years 2.1 years – –
CF I: no skill-bias in earnings 4.1 years 1.7 years 0.4 years 19%
CF II: no skill-bias in med. eff. 3.3 years 0.9 years 1.2 years 57%
CF III: no skill-bias in insurance 4.4 years 2.0 years 0.1 years 5 %
Sum CF I-III: – – 1.7 years 81%
CF V: CF I-III combined 2.9 years 0.5 years – 24%
36We are grateful to a reviewer for drawing our attention to this issue.
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income gradient in the valuation of health/survival more than over-
compensates the gradient in the time cost associated with the con-
sumption of health care.
Fourth, while our model is relying on market clearance through
price adjustments, which we believe to be a reasonable representation
of the US health care system, congestion within the health care system
may pose direct constraints on access. While we need to relegate to
future research the modelling of congestion as an endogenous gap be-
tween the demand for health care and a constrained capacity, we can
speculate on its consequences within the setting we are considering. In
as far as congestion leads to a uniform increase in the price for health
care akin to medical price inflation, this would be detrimental to the
survival of both skill groups but without further consequences for the
longevity gradient. In as far as congestion is associated with a lower
effectiveness of care (due to e.g. waiting times or cuts in the quality of
health care) the consequences depend on whether the reduction in ef-
fectiveness is symmetric or whether it is biased against one of the skill
groups. In the former case, congestion would lower the survival pro-
spects for both skill groups but, in reversal to the impact of medical
progress, may effectively reduce the longevity gap. This effect would be
offset to the extent that the unskilled are more exposed to the impact of
congestion.
Fifth, Chetty et al. (2016) find that the longevity gap is considerably
smaller in affluent cities with well-educated populations, such as New
York or San Francisco. The authors suggest that one possible reason for
this may lie in the presence of neighbourhood effects leading to spil-
lovers from well-educated individuals to the less-educated. These may
come in the direct form of informational spillovers through social ex-
change, but perhaps more so through the provision of better and/or
more extensive health care facilities with public good features financed
through the higher expenditure of the skilled/well-to-do. Similarly, the
higher spending of the skilled/well-to-do may induce R&D into medical
innovations which subsequently benefit the unskilled as well (see
Frankovic and Kuhn, 2018 for a similar argument relating to inter-
generational spillovers). Tracing out how policy and institutions are
shaping such spillovers constitutes an interesting application of our
model.
We relegate extensions along these five lines to future study.
Optimal solution to the life-cycle problem
For notational convenience, we drop the group index i. The individual’s life-cycle problem, i.e. the maximisation of ( 5) subject to (6) and (7) can
be expressed by the Hamiltonian
H = + + + + +uS µS rk lw c p h e s( ( ) ),S k
with S and k denoting the co-states on S and k, respectively. We obtain the first-order conditions37
H = =u S 0,c c k (28)
H = =m S p 0,h S h k (29)
and the adjoint equations= + +µ u pe( ) ,S S k S (30)= r( ) .k k (31)
Evaluating (28) at two different ages/years a t( , ) and +a t a a( , ), equating the terms, and rearranging gives us
=
= + + +
+ + +
µ a t a a r t a a daexp{ [ ( , ) ( )] },
u c a t a a
u c a t
a t a a
a t
S a t
S a t a a
a
a
( ( , ))
( ( , ))
( , )
( , )
( , )
( , )
c
c
k
k
(32)
where the second equality follows when integrating the adjoint Eq. (31) to obtain k. Substituting =u c c( )c , as from (4), and rearranging further,
(32) is readily transformed into the Euler Eq. (25) given in the main body of the paper.
Inserting (28) into (29) allows to rewrite the first-order condition for health care as
=
u
p
m
.S
c h (33)
Integrating (30) we obtain
= + × + +a t u c u c p t a a e S S µ a t a a da da( , ) [ ( (·)) ( (·)) (·) ( ) ( (·)) (·)] exp ( ( , )) ,S a c S a a
where = +a t a a(·) ( , ). Using this, we can express the value of health/survival as
= + + × + +a t a t
u a t
u c a t a a
u c a t
u c
u c
p t a a e S S µ a t a a da da( , ) ( , )
( , )
( ( , ))
( ( , ))
( (·))
( (·))
(·) ( ) ( (·)) (·) exp ( ( , )) .S
c a
c
c c
S a
a
Inserting from (32); observing from (3) and (4) that =e S( (·))S e SS( (·))(·)2 and = + c b(·)u cu c c( (·))( (·)) (·)1c , respectively; substituting and rearranging ap-
propriately gives (26) in the main body of the paper. Inserting this into (33); observing from (1) and (2) that = =mh Mmh Mµh ; substituting andrearranging then gives (27) in the main body of the paper.
37 Here, u m,c h and eS refer to the partial derivatives of the respective functions.
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Characterisation of general equilibrium
In this Appendix we provide a general characterisation of the general equilibrium, deferring to Appendix “Equilibrium relationships with cobb-
douglas technologies” a more detailed derivation for the case of Cobb-Douglas production functions. For each period t we have the following
unknown variables:
• inputs K t K t L t L t L t L t{ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )}Y H sY uY sH uH ,• prices r t w t w t p t{ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )}s u ,• aggregate demand C t H t{ ( ), ( )},• aggregate net saving, equivalent to the change in the capital stock K t( ),
summing up to 13 variables. These are determined through (we drop the time index for convenience)
• 6 first-order conditions on factor inputs [see (34)–(36) in Appendix “Equilibrium relationships with cobb-douglas technologies”], which give the
factor demand functions K r w w K r w w p L r w w L r w w L r w w p L r w w p{ ( , , ), ( , , , ), ( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , , ), ( , , , )}Y s u H s u sY s u uY s u sH s u uH s u , depending on the
factor prices and, in case of the health care sector, on the price for health care;• a set of first-order conditions (25) and (27) for a [0, ], which together with the individual’s life-cycle budget constraint (7) determine the
a t i( , , )-specific levels of consumption c a t( , )i and elective health care h a t( , )i . Aggregation according to ( 11) and (12) gives the demand for
consumption C r w w p( , , , )s u and health care H r w w p( , , , )s u , depending on the four prices;38• 5 market clearing conditions + =+ =+ === + +
K r w w K r w w p K
L r w w L r w w p L
L r w w L r w w p L
F A K r w w p L r w w p L r w w p H r w w p
Y A K r w w p L r w w p L r w w p C r w w p K t K
( , , ) ( , , , ) ,
( , , ) ( , , , ) ,
( , , ) ( , , , )
( , ( , , , ), ( , , , ), ( , , , )) ( , , , ),
( , ( , , , ), ( , , , ), ( , , , )) ( , , , ) ( ) ,
Y
s u
H
s u
s
Y
s u s
H
s u s
u
Y
s u u
H
s u u
H H
s u s
H
s u u
H
s u s u
Y Y
s u s
Y
s u u
Y
s u s u
which determine the set of equilibrium prices r w w p{ , , , }s u and aggregate net saving, as captured by K t( ).
Equilibrium relationships with cobb-douglas technologies
For reasons of saving space, we omit time indices throughout. Perfectly competitive firms in the production sector choose capital KY and labour
L L{ , }sY uY so as to maximise period profit (14) subject to the production technology in (13). Likewise, providers of health care choose capital KH and
labour L L{ , }sH uH so as to maximise period profit (16) subject to (15). From the first-order conditions
+ = =r Y
K
p F
K
,KY
K
H (34)
= =w Y
L
p F
L
,s s
s
Y
s
s
H (35)
= =w Y
L
p F
L
,u u
u
Y
u
u
H (36)
we obtain factor demand as
= + = =K Yr L Yw L Yw, , ,Y K sY s s uY u u
and
= + = =K pFr L pFw L pFw, , ,H K sH s s uH u u (37)
respectively. From this we can calculate the factor intensities
= = +k KL wr: ,Y YuY Ku u (38)
= =L
L
w
w
: ,Y s
Y
u
Y
s
u
u
s (39)
= = +k KL wr: ,H HuH Ku u (40)
38 Through the life-cycle budget constraint and the individual Euler equation, the demand function C (·) is also contingent on the expectation about future prices
over the remaining life-course. The same applies to the demand function H (·) for which the future price paths filter in through the value of health/survival.
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= =L
L
w
w
: ,H s
H
u
H
s
s
u
s (41)
respectively. Now write
= = = +w YL A k A wr( ) ( ) ( )u uuY u Y Y Y u Y Ku u YK s K s
and solve for
= = +w w r A r( , ) ( ) .u u Y u Y K Y
1
1K
s K
(42)
We then obtain from (39)
= = = +w w r w r A r( , ) ( , ) ( ) .s s Y su u YY s Y K Y
1
1K
u K
(43)
Inserting from (37) into (15) and solving for p we obtain
= = +p p r
A
r w r w r( , ) 1 ( , ) ( , )Y H
K
s
Y
s
u
Y
u
K s u
(44)
with w r( , )u Y and w r( , )s Y as given by (42) and (43), respectively. This fixes the wage rates and the price for health care as functions of the interest
rate and the “skill-intensity” in final goods production, Y . Using Ls and Lu to denote the supply of skilled and unskilled labour, respectively, we can
write
= = = = ( )L
L
L L
L L
L L
L L
L L
L L
.Y s
Y
u
Y
s s
H
u u
H
s
H
u
H
u u
H
s
Y
u
H
u u
H
s
u
u
s
(45)
where we have employed = ( )H Ysu us as from (39) and (41). The outer equation in (45) solves to= = ( )L
L
L L
( )
1
,Y Y uH s
u u
Hs
u
u
s (46)
which fixes the skill-intensity as a function of unskilled labour demand in the health care sector (as well as the exogenous levels of skilled and
unskilled labour supply).
Using the market clearing condition in the health care sector and inserting from (40) and (41), we obtain
=
=
+
+ ( )
H A L
A L L( ) ,
H
u
H w r L
r
w r L
w r L
H
u
H w r L
r
Y
u
H
( , ( )) ( , ( ))
( , ( ))
( , ( ))
K
u
u
Y
uH
K
s
u
u
Y
uH
s
Y
u
H
s
K
u
u
Y
u
H K
s
u
u
s
s
with w r L( , ( ))u Y uH and L( )Y uH as defined in ( 42) and (46), respectively. The equality can be solved to obtain the demand for unskilled labour as a
function of the interest rate [and the equilibrium demand for health care =H H p r L( ( , ( )))Y uH ] such that ultimately, =L L r( )uH uH . This also fixes
the skill-intensity L r( ( ))Y uH and, in turn, all prices as a function of the interest rate. The remaining factor demand functions then follow as=
= =
= =
=
=
=
=
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+
+
+
+
+
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Thus, in order to ensure non-negative factor inputs, we need to make but a single assumption, namely that L L r( )u uH .
This leaves r and K t( ) to be determined. The former follows from the capital market equilibrium+ =K r K r K r( ) ( ) ( ),Y H
the latter follows from the goods market equilibrium
= + + +A K r L r L r C K r K r K t( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) [ ( ) ( )] ( ).Y Y sY uY Y HK s u
Solving the numerical problem
We pursue the following steps towards tracing out the numerical solution, sketched here for the benchmark scenario:
1. We derive from the first-order condition for consumption (25) the relationship
+ = + + +{ }c a t a c t r t a µ a t a da( , ) (0, ) exp [ ( ) ( , )] .i i a i0 0 0 0 0 (47)
for =i s u, .
2. We derive the life-cycle budget constraint+ + ++ + + ++ + =
w t a l a c a t a a t
a t p t a h a t a e S a t a
a t s t a
R a da
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( )( ( , ) ( ( , )))
( , ) ( )
( , 0) 0,
i i i
i i i
i
0
0 0
0 0 0
0
with R a( , 0) as given by
+R a a r t a a da( , ) exp ( ) .
a
a
(48)
We then insert (47) and obtain the consumption level
=
+ + + ++ + + +
+ + +{ }c t
w t a l a a t a t s t a
a t p t a h a t a e S a t a R a da
r t a da da
(0, )
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )
( , ) ( )( ( , ) ( ( , ))) ( , 0)
exp ( )
i
i i i
i i i
a µ a t a
0
0
0 0
0 0 0
0 0
1
0
( , )i 0
(49)
for an individual born at t0, contingent on the stream of health care, +h a t a( , )i 0 , and the set of prices + + +w t a r t a p t a{ ( ), ( ), ( )}i 0 0 0 over the
interval +t t[ , ]0 0 . Finally, we need to keep track of the constraint on minimum consumption at the level of social security benefits. As is readily
checked from the numerical analysis, this constraint is binding only at the highest ages.
3. We derive from the first-order condition for health care (27) a vector of age-specific demand levels
+ = + + ++ + + +h a t a a t a a t a M t aa t a p t a, ( , ) ( , ) ( )( , ) ( )i i i ii M t a0 0 0 00 0
1
1 ( )i 0
(50)
for all a [0, ].
4. We show in Section “Equilibrium relationships with cobb-douglas technologies” that the set of prices + +w t a p t a{ ( ), ( )}i 0 0 as well as all input
and output quantities can be expressed in terms of the interest rate +r t a( )0 alone.
5. Using (49) together with (50) we can calculate the life-cycle allocation for consumption, +c a t a( , )i 0 , depending on the allocation for health
expenditures, +h a t a a( , ), [0, ]i 0 and on the set of prices + + +w t a r t a p t a{ ( ), ( ), ( )}i 0 0 0 over the interval +t t[ , ]0 0 . Vice versa, the
allocation of health expenditures can be calculated from the allocation of consumption and the macroeconomic prices.
6. We apply these calculations iteratively on initial guesses of c and h. We then use the results as an initial input to the age-structured optimal
control algorithm, as presented in Veliov (2003). This yields an optimal allocation of individual consumption and health expenditures contingent
on an initially assumed +r t a( )0 .
7. Drawing on this, we apply the following recursive approximation algorithm: (i) Guess an initial interest rate +r t a( )0 and derive the optimal life-
cycle allocation. (ii) Based on this, calculate the market interest rate +r t a( )0 from the capital market equilibrium+ + + = +K r t a K r t a K r t a( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))Y H0 0 0 . (iii) Adjust the initial interest rate, so that it approaches +r t a( )0 , e.g. by setting+ + + + +r t a r t a r t a r t a( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )), (0, 1]1 0 0 0 0 0 0 . The process converges to an interest rate for which households optimise and
capital demand equals capital supply. The output market clearing condition, + = + + + + +Y t a C t a K t a K t a( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 0 0 then determines the
dynamics of the capital stock to the next period. (iv) This process is reiterated in a recursive way, employing a solution algorithm based on
Newton’s method. Eqs. 49 and 50 allow us to verify ex-post an optimum life-cycle allocation for the focal cohort born at t0. While the numerical
algorithm cannot determine in a precise way the optimal allocation for other cohorts, it nevertheless structures the allocation in a way that
approximates the optimum for all cohorts.
We solve the model over a period of 300 periods, covering the years 1850–2150. The number of periods is chosen to be this large in order for the
initial and final conditions of the model simulation not to matter for the period of interest (1960–2015). The periods 1850 to 1950 are characterised
by a steady state where all exogenous variables generating the model dynamics (i.e. A A M, ,Y H s etc.) over the period of interest are held constant.
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Beginning in 1950, we impose growth trends on the exogenous variables so as to generate the baseline model dynamics described in the main text. To
generate the counterfactual experiments, we switch off the growth in the corresponding exogenous variables. The periods after 2015 describe a slow
reduction in the growth rate of these exogenous variables over a period of 50 years and a steady-state over the remaining periods up to 2150. The
simulation of the periods before and after the time frame of interest has no economic interpretation and only serves the purpose of providing a stable
steady-state between the calibrated dynamic transition process.
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